Abstract
Integrating new institutional economics and resource dependence theory, this study investigates whether in transition economies, characterized by shifting from centrally commanded to more market-oriented economies, there are performance differences among family firms (FFs), nonfamily firms (non-FFs), and former state-owned enterprises (former SOEs), and whether political connections affect these differences. Our findings suggest that FFs outperform non-FFs and former SOEs, unless non-FFs have politically connected CEOs. The performance gap in favor of FFs increases at high levels of board political connection intensity. Among FFs, the top-performing ones either promote nonfamily leadership or combine family leadership with politically connected boards of directors.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-33 |
| Number of pages | 33 |
| Journal | Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - 2021 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The corresponding author received financial support from The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for this research as a part of his doctoral studies.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2021.
Other keywords
- board of directors
- family CEO
- family firm
- firm performance
- former SOEs
- political connection
- transition economy
- Vietnam