Cost sharing and catch sharing

Thorolfur Matthiasson*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)


The model developed in this paper attempts to provide an explanation of the fact that Icelandic vessel owners and Icelandic skippers do not share costs of operation of a vessel. In the model, a skipper is contracted to take a fishing vessel to the fishing ground. The skipper is remunerated with a share of the catch, subject to an agreed minimum. Skippers and vessel owners are modelled as if risk-neutral. Skippers develop a fishing strategy which is more costly, the higher the value of the potential catch associated with that strategy. Costs that accrue are partly pecuniary (and shareable) and partly skipper-specific (and non-shareable). The conclusions of the paper demonstrate that given the assumptions of our model, a vessel owner should prefer a remuneration contract with a positive revenue share and zero cost share. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)25-44
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Development Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Feb 1999

Other keywords

  • Cost sharing
  • Fishing
  • Remuneration systems


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