A non-perpetual shirking model

Yu Fu Chen, Gylfi Zoega*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers' effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)98-101
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Financial support from the Icelandic Centre for Research , grant 130551-053 and the University of Iceland Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for comments.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V.

Other keywords

  • Finite horizons
  • Retirement
  • Shirking
  • Wages


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